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I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses (“APRNs”) are skilled
clinicians whose expertise could aid immensely in the expansion
and affordability of healthcare in the United States. Unfortunately,
their practice is often hobbled by cumbersome collaborative
agreements with physicians. A 2011 Institute of Medicine (“IOM”)
report on the future of nursing recommended that “[n]urses should
practice to the full extent of their education and training.”1 This
would entail uncoupling APRNs from physician oversight of their
practice, as current regulation in most states mandates that APRNs
must operate to some extent in collaboration with, and accountable
to, a supervising physician.
While many states currently have legislation in place—or
pending—granting APRNs the right to practice to the extent of their
training, the expansion of APRN roles in the care of patients is not
without controversy.2 The IOM report received backlash from
physician groups, including the American Medical Association
(“AMA”), who urged that such expansion would not improve
quality of care, ostensibly because nurses do not receive the level of
training that physicians receive.3 However, such concerns are
almost entirely unsupported by empirical studies. Moreover, this
interference from physicians, in the face of ample evidence that
APRNs supply care that is at least favorably comparable to that of
physicians, calls into question whether physicians have patients’
best interests in mind, or whether their attitudes and actions are in
1

NST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH S-4
(2011) [hereinafter IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], available at http://www.thefuture
ofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20Nursing%20Report_0.pdf.
2
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR
CONSUMERS 2-3, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
3
Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n., AMA Responds to IOM Report on Future of
Nursing (Oct. 5, 2010) available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/
nursing-future-workforce.page.
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fact anticompetitive.
The question then becomes whether
physicians’ opposition puts them at risk of antitrust liability.
This Note proceeds in three parts: Part II introduces the reader
to APRNs, including their training, education and practice, and the
data available on their competency as healthcare practitioners. It
also discusses the clinician shortages and expanded Medicaid and
insurance coverage that leads to the necessity of expanded access to
healthcare.
Part III discusses the current legislative scheme that regulates
the scope of practice for APRNs. It then explores the Institute of
Medicine’s report and efforts from various agencies advocating the
expanded scope of practice for APRNs. This Note calls upon current
legislatures, especially New Jersey’s, to amend laws governing the
practice of nursing to expand APRNs’ scope of practice.
Part IV discusses physician opposition to this legislative action,
and opines that it is motivated by anticompetitive concerns rather
than patient care concerns; this section suggests possible remedies,
concluding with the proposition that while antitrust actions may
provide some limited remedies for isolated cases of blatant
anticompetitive behavior, the issue must ultimately be resolved by
state legislatures.4
II. APRN BACKGROUND AND REGULATION
A. Introduction to APRN
“APRN” is a specific category of nursing professional as defined
by most state practice laws.5 An APRN is a medical professional with
an advanced nursing (post-graduate) degree in one of four
specialties: certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”), certified
nurse-midwife (“CNM”), clinical nurse specialist (“CNS”), and
certified nurse practitioner (“CNP”).6 Each practitioner specializes
4

This Note does not argue or advocate for expanded scope of practice for any
professions aside from that of APRNs. While I acknowledge that certain other
practitioners, including chiropractors, naturopaths, and various others argue for
expanded scope of practice rights, these professions are starkly distinct from APRNs,
and their arguments for expanded scope of practice are not meant to be supported by
the research found in this Note.
5
Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal
Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 145 (2014).
6
APRN CONSENSUS WORK GRP & NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING.,
CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION: LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION &
EDUCATION 6 (2008) [hereinafter NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL], https://www.ncsbn.
org/Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2015).
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in the care of at least one population, including: family/individual
across the lifespan, adult-gerontology, pediatrics, neonatal,
women’s health/gender-related, or psych/mental health.7
Academics have discussed whether APRNs should complete a
residency program for clinical training, and there currently exist
several such programs throughout the United States.8 Many
institutions conferring APRN degrees carry a credit load which, in
other healthcare degree programs, would be equivalent to a doctoral
degree.9
Each APRN specialist is trained in a specific area of healthcare.
The CRNA is trained to provide anesthesia for a diverse spectrum of
patients in diverse locations.10 He or she will administer anesthesia
to both healthy and severely ill patients, for a wide variety of
procedures, in settings that include “hospital surgical suites and
obstetrical delivery rooms; critical access hospitals; acute care; pain
management centers; ambulatory surgical centers; and the offices of
dentists, podiatrists, ophthalmologists, and plastic surgeons.”11
The CNM provides a wide variety of care to women, “including
gynecologic care, family planning services, preconception care,
prenatal and postpartum care, childbirth, and care of the
newborn.”12 For treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and
reproductive health, patients of the CNM occasionally include the
male partners of their female patients.13 The CNM practices in many
settings, including “home, hospital, birth center, and a variety of
ambulatory care settings including private offices and community
and public health clinics.”14
The CNS “is responsible and accountable for diagnosis and
7

Id. at 6.
Kate Darby Rauch, Are Residencies the Future of Nurse Practitioner Training?,
SCIENCE OF CARING (Jan. 2013), http://scienceofcaring.ucsf.edu/future-nursing/areresidencies-future-nurse-practitioner-training#sthash.mROjZli6.dpuf.
9
AM. ASS’N OF COLLEGES OF NURSING, THE DOCTOR OF NURSING PRACTICE (2013),
http://www.aacn.nche.edu/media-relations/fact-sheets/DNPFactSheet.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015). The subjects of whether the Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) degree
should be a prerequisite to APRN status, and the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising”
campaign focusing on allegedly misleading applications of the DNP degree are not
addressed in this Note.
10
See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8.
11
Id.; see also AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS, QUALIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF
THE CERTIFIED REGISTERED NURSE ANESTHETIST, http://www.aana.com/ceandeducation/
becomeacrna/Pages/Qualifications-and-Capabilities-of-the-Certified-RegisteredNurse-Anesthetist-.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
12
See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8.
13
Id.
14
Id.
8
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treatment of health/illness states, disease management, health
promotion, and prevention of illness and risk behaviors among
individuals, families, groups, and communities,” integrating care
between and among the three spheres of influence: patient, nurse,
and system.15 The CNS concept was developed in World War II,
when the need emerged to have highly qualified nurses involved in
patient care.16 His or her primary goal is to improve patient
outcomes and the quality of nursing care, and while the CNS has
traditionally worked in hospitals, the role is expanding into nursing
homes, schools, home care, and hospice.17 Historically, the CNS
role has been subject to ambiguity, and CNSs have assumed many
different responsibilities, including “staff and patient educator,
consultant, supervisor, project director, and more recently, case
manager.”18
NPs are perhaps the most recognizable of the four APRN roles,
and they are especially ubiquitous in their areas of specialty. NPs
“diagnose; develop differential diagnoses; order, conduct, supervise,
and interpret diagnostic and laboratory tests; and prescribe
pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic treatments in the direct
management of acute and chronic illness and disease,” and they
perform all of these tasks across virtually every medical specialty and
subspecialty.19 NPs may practice autonomously or in collaboration
with other healthcare professionals.20
B. APRN Training
Regarding the sufficiency of APRN education and training, the
American Association of Nurse Practitioners (“AANP”) highlights
the fact that nursing students start their formal healthcare education
before entering graduate school (as opposed to physicians, who
begin that work in medical school). This training includes “physical
assessment skills, interpreting diagnostic test results, [and]
evaluating the appropriateness of medications and patients’
responses to treatments in both hospital and community settings.”21
15
16

Id. at 8-9.
Michalene Jansen et al., Advanced Practice Nursing 20 (4th ed. Springer Publ’g

2009).
17

See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8-9.
See Jansen, supra note 16.
19
Id. at 16; What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015),
http://www.aanp.org/all-about-nps/what-is-an-np.
20
See What’s an NP?, supra note 19.
21
Clinical Outcomes: The Yardstick of Educational Effectiveness, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE
PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/images/documents/publications
18
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The AANP observes further that nursing education is based upon
competency, rather than time spent in school.22 Indeed, the AANP
quoted a physician from the American Academy of Family
Physicians (“AAFP”)—an organization that actively opposes scope
of practice reform—criticizing the current method in medical
education of using time in school, rather than competency, as the
yardstick for measuring successful education.23
C. APRN Regulation
In many states, APRNs are restricted by local regulatory
schemes that prevent them from practicing to the full extent of their
education. Specifically, “scope of practice,” a term used with all
licensed health practitioners, describes “the rules, the regulations,
and the boundaries within which a fully qualified practitioner with
substantial and appropriate training, knowledge, and experience
may practice in a field of medicine or surgery, or other specifically
defined field.”24 Under the current regulatory scheme in most states,
even though APRNs receive training that qualifies them to practice
in areas beyond these limits, they are either entirely denied the right
/clinicaloutcomesyardstick.pdf.
22
Id.
23
Id. The physician told AAFP News Now,
Both in medical student education and residency, we have clung to the
belief that if you spend a certain amount of time learning about
something, then you must know it. That’s as ridiculous as thinking that
a teenager should be given a [driver’s] license just because he or she spent
a set number of hours behind the wheel of a car.
Id.; see also Anna-Lena Nieminen, Bodil Mannevaara & Lisbeth Fagerström, Advanced
Practice Nurses’ Scope of Practice: A Qualitative Study of Advanced Clinical
Competencies, 25 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF CARING SCI. 662, 661-670 (2011):
Many researchers relate RNs’ clinical competence to the nurse-patient
relationship while relating the quality of nursing care to a population’s
health needs []. The description of clinical competence varies from tasks
to be done to a holistic view that includes knowledge, skills, ability, and
ethical conduct []. Several researchers emphasize that both practical and
theoretical knowledge are part of professional clinical competence [].
Clinical competence is based on a nurse’s ability to integrate nursing
science and other sciences into his/her clinical competence []. The
practical knowledge in clinical nursing care is also formed through role
models []. An RN’s clinical competence consists of his/her personal
ability and capability in implementing knowledge in different nursing
contexts and situations in cooperation with others.
Id.
24
FED’N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, ASSESSING SCOPE OF PRACTICE IN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY: CRITICAL QUESTIONS IN ASSURING PUBLIC ACCESS AND SAFETY (2005),
http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/2005_grpol_scope_of_practice.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,
2015).
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to do so, or must work under restrictive collaborative agreements,
wherein they ostensibly are supervised by a physician.25 As I will
demonstrate in this Note, these regulatory schemes have nothing to
do with empirical evidence regarding patient outcomes,
competency, or malpractice concerns; rather, they are simply an
outgrowth of unsubstantiated and misleading claims by physicians’
groups that the traditional system of physician-led healthcare teams
must be preserved.
i. Expanding Scope of Practice - Access
The current impetus for APRN scope of practice expansion is
the gap in access to quality medical care, especially primary care.
The number of physicians entering into primary care or internal
medicine is steadily decreasing, while the number of nurse
practitioners (“NPs”) is increasing.26 The AMA has cited experts
predicting a shortage of more than 45,000 primary care physicians
by 2020.27 This shortage is attributed to several factors: increased
demand for healthcare brought on by the aging of the “baby
boomer” generation, the influx of newly insured Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) beneficiaries, decreased supply resulting from a large class
of primary care physicians retiring (also baby boomers), and the
decreased interest from medical students in primary care, largely due
to low reimbursement rates.28 While there is disagreement over the
extent of the shortage, experts agree that poor urban and rural areas
are most affected.29 APRNs, if untethered from supervising
25
AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, GUIDELINES ON THE SUPERVISION OF CERTIFIED
NURSE MIDWIVES, NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2008),
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/news/NP_Info_GlinesNP-060710.pdf
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015); Joanne Pohl et al., The Latest Data On Primary Care Nurse
Practitioners And Physicians: Can We Afford To Waste Our Workforce?, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Jun. 18 2013) (“More than half the states require physician supervision or
collaboration for an NP to practice, despite the lack of any data to support the need for
such a regulation”).
26
Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Reinventing
Primary Care, 29 Health Aff. 893, 893-94 (2010).
27
Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Urges Continued Support for
Adequate Graduate Medical Education Funding to Meet Future Physician Workforce
Needs (July 29, 2014), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/
2014/2014-07-29-support-graduate-medical-education-funding.page.
28
Mark D. Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Primary Care Workforce
Bottleneck, 27 J. of Gen. Internal Med. 469, 469-72 (2012); Stephen C. Schimpff, Why
is there a shortage of primary care physicians?, KEVINMD.COM (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/shortage-primary-care-physicians.html.
29
The Editorial Bd., Bottlenecks in Training Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/opinion/sunday/bottlenecks-in-trainingdoctors.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
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physicians, would be able to expand into rural areas that physicians
eschew.30 Currently, 18% of NPs practice in such rural areas, while
CNMs attend a “substantial portion of births” and CRNAs are the
sole anesthesia providers in 85% of those rural areas.31 This is
possible because in many of these rural states, scope of practice for
APRNs has already been expanded to allow a more liberal
collaborative agreement, or collaborative agreements have been
entirely eliminated, allowing full scope of practice.32
ii. Economic Benefits
The other impetus for legislation is the possible economic
benefits of expanded scope, though even the IOM report concedes
that an analysis of those benefits is problematic.33 However, one
study in 2009 projected that Massachusetts (which at the time was
the only state to have passed sweeping healthcare legislation) could
save $4.2 billion to $8.4 billion on healthcare between 2010-2020
by expanding scope of practice for NPs.34 That study further
proposed that encouraging the use of CNMs for low-risk
pregnancies and CRNAs for certain surgeries could similarly reduce
costs.35 Linked to this finding is the proposal, in the same report,
that the promotion of “retail clinics”— i.e., clinics found in retail
shopping centers and drug stores—could save the state $6 billion
between 2010-2020.36 The economic benefit stems from the fact
that NPs generally staff such clinics, though they would need full
prescriptive privileges for the state to realize these gains.37 It should
be noted, however, that the economic motive is secondary to the
overall goal of promoting both access to care and quality of care,
and since part of the agenda for APRNs is to achieve parity of
reimbursement with physicians for equal service, the economic
benefit could ultimately prove negligible.38
30

Sylvia Smith, Nurse Practitioners Fill the Gap, AARP THE MAGAZINE, AARP.ORG,
(Aug.-Sept.,
2014),
http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/nursepractitioners-fill-the-gap.html.
31
Kelly A. Goudreau et al., HEALTH POLICY AND ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING 33
(Springer Publ’g 2013).
32
See discussion, Part III, infra.
33
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-8.
34
Christine E. Eibner et al., Controlling Health Care Spending in Massachusetts: An
Analysis of Options, 103-04 (Rand 2009).
35
Id. at 108.
36
Id. at 87.
37
Id. at 85.
38
Patricia L. Starck, The Cost of Doing Business in Nursing Education, 21 J. of Prof.
Nursing 183, 185 (2005); IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8.
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III. LEGISLATING SCOPE OF PRACTICE BARRIERS
A. Federal Legislation
The IOM report makes separate recommendations for federal
and state legislative action. Regarding federal action, it
recommends: (1) expanding Medicare to cover APRN services
currently allowed under state law, as PCPs are covered, and at the
same rates; (2) amending Medicare to authorize certain APRN
admitting privileges and certifications; (3) extending the ACA
Medicaid reimbursement increases for primary care physicians to
cover APRN services; and (4) limiting federal funding for nursing
programs only to states that have adopted the National Council of
State Boards of Nursing (“NCSBN”) advanced practice registered
nurse model rules and regulations.39
i. Expanding Medicare
Current Medicare Conditions of Participation (“Conditions”)
enable CRNAs and CNMs to perform services without a
collaboration agreement with physicians in order to be reimbursed,
though neither will necessarily receive reimbursement equal to that
of a physician performing the same procedure.40 By contrast, the
Conditions require that an NP or a CNS must work in collaboration
with a physician, despite the existence of a more permissive state
scope of practice scheme.41 Medicare reimburses the NP or CNS up
to 85% of what a physician would earn for the same service.42 The
committee advising Congress on the matter has not provided an
analytical justification for the difference in reimbursement rates.43
Since insurance companies take their cues from Medicare regarding
39
Id.; see Consensus Model for APRN Regulation: Licensure, Accreditation, Certification
& Education, APRN JOINT DIALOGUE GROUP REPORT, July 7, 2008, at 7, available at
http://www.aacn.nche.edu/education-resources/APRNReport.pdf; see also Robert
Pear, As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/us/obamacaremedicaid-fee-increases-expiring.html?_r=2 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (the increased
reimbursement expired on December 31, 2014).
40
Dep’t of Health and Human Services Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
MEDICARE INFORMATION FOR ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES, ANESTHESIOLOGIST
ASSISTANTS, AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2011).
41
At-a-Glance Billing Guidelines, TEX. MED. ASS’N., http://www.texmed.org/
Template.aspx?id=2273 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
42
Id.
43
Amanda Cassidy, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 25,
2012, http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=79. (“The
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the federal agency that advises Congress on
Medicare issues, found that there was no analytical foundation for this difference.”).
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reimbursement rates for APRN services, an increase in the Medicare
reimbursement rate could therefore affect the insurance
reimbursement rate.44
ii. Amending Medicare
The goal to amend Medicare was introduced because, as it is
currently written, Medicare will only allow a physician (not an
APRN) to certify patients for, among other things, home health and
hospice care.45 This kind of care allows Medicare recipients to
receive certain personal care services—including end of life and
palliative care—at home, rather than in an extended-stay hospital or
nursing home.46 Approximately 33% of Medicare beneficiaries
experienced some kind of adverse effect as a result of a stay at a
skilled nursing home.47 Furthermore, the vast majority of seniors
favor granting more access for the elderly and infirm to at-home
care.48 Giving APRNs the ability to certify this type of care would
improve access and expediency for this service.49 Once again,
Congress has failed to act in this regard.
iii. Reimbursement
The third IOM recommendation called for extending to APRNs
the ACA reimbursement for primary care physicians. The provision
in question increased mandatory Medicaid rates paid to certain
primary care physicians to equal the rates paid by Medicare for the
same services.50 This provision expired in 2014, however, after an
44

Lorraine Bock, Changing Reimbursement Policies, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK
http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb.com
/Article/Changing-Reimbursement-Policies.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also 42
U.S.C.S. § 1395b-6 (LexisNexis 2015) (establishing the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, which advises Congress on payment policies under Medicare).
45
42 U.S.C.S. § 1395f (LexisNexis 2015); see also Sarah Kliff, Obamacare is ramping
up a health-care turf war, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/27/how-obamacare-is-ramping-up-a-health-care-turfwar/.
46
Andrea Brassard, Removing Barriers to Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Care:
Home Health and Hospice Services, 66 INSIGHT ON THE ISSUES 1, 2 (July 2012), available at
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/health/remo
ving-barriers-advanced-practice-registered-nurse-home-health-hospice-insight-july2012-AARP-ppi-health.pdf.
47
Adverse Events in Skilled Nursing Facilities: National Incidence Among Medicare
Beneficiaries, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. 1, 17-22
(2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-11-00370.pdf.
48
Brassard, supra note 45, at 4.
49
Id.
50
Dep’t of Health & Human Services Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
FOR NPS AND PAS,
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extension failed to escape committee in the Republican-controlled
Congress.51 This recommendation was essentially no different from
other reimbursement equality provisions envisioned by the Report,
except that its acceptance could have theoretically increased
healthcare access in underserved areas. Many of the underserved
receive their healthcare from Medicaid-funded community health
centers.52 Those health centers receiving the benefit of Medicaid
expansion granted by the ACA saw an increase in staff in all
positions except NPs, even though NPs account for a large portion
of the providers in such facilities.53
Additionally, given the ACA’s use of the word “clinicians”
rather than “physicians” in much of its language, there seems to be
a presumption in favor of diversified healthcare practitioners.54
Furthermore, the provision for Centers of Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation (“CMMI”) has presumably left the door open for the
inclusion of APRNs in future projects, once the second round of
funding for those projects begins.55
iv. Limiting Federal Funding to Consensus Model States
The fourth recommendation – limiting federal funding for
nursing programs to those states that have adopted the NCBSN
Consensus Model – is arguably the most effective tool to wrangle
the states into uniformity on the issue of APRN scope of practice.
The Consensus Model is the product of approximately four
years of discussion between twenty-three nursing organizations and

MEDICAID PROGRAM; PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES FURNISHED BY CERTAIN PRIMARY CARE
PHYSICIANS AND CHARGES FOR VACCINE ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE VACCINES FOR CHILDREN
PROGRAM 1, 3 (2009), http://www.beckersasc.com/docs/oldmedia/CMSFinalRulePCP
Medicaid.pdf.
51
Pear, supra note 38, at 738.
52
Medicaid and Community Health Centers: The Relationship Between Coverage for
Adults and Primary Care Capacity in Medically Underserved Communities, THE KAISER
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED 1, 2 (March 2012), https://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8293.pdf.
53
Id.at 1-2.
54
Jansen, supra note 16, at 90.
55
Jansen, supra note 16, at 90. The CMMI is a program within the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) created by the ACA, which allows more
freedom for CMS to experiment with new and innovative approaches to healthcare.
Innovations provided for in the legislation include, inter alia, insurance exchanges for
those not covered by government or third party insurance programs, a Medicare
accountable care organization pilot program, and a program to provide funding for the
transitional care of patients being discharged from hospitals. The funding for these
programs is not necessarily limited to only physicians.
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the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (“NCSBN”).56 The
NCSBN is an independent, not-for-profit association through which
state boards of nursing act to standardize certain practices affecting
nursing professions.57 The NCSBN joined with these other nursing
organizations to form the Consensus Model in order to rein in the
chaotic nature of APRN regulation and implement a stable and
systematic expression of the designation “APRN.” This union finally
brought together a coherent system that covers licensure,
accreditation, certification, and education (“LACE”).58 The Model
Act (for the practice of nursing) and Model Rules emerged from this
effort.59 As states implement the consensus model, state regulation
nationwide will move closer to uniformity in scope of practice
regulation.60 Withholding federal funding for nursing education
from those states that do not conform to the consensus model could
be a very effective way to encourage state consensus; however, there
is no sign at all of congressional action in this area.
v. Spurring Action
What exactly is needed to spur Congressional action to meet
the IOM goals? Healthcare is famously a huge source of contention
in Congress, but nursing itself can be a bi-partisan issue. A brief
overview of the regions allowing expansive scope of practice
compared with stricter jurisdictions shows that while the
traditionally “red” Southeast region is, en masse, the most restrictive
region, traditionally “blue” stronghold states like New York, New
Jersey, and California are similarly restrictive.61 On the other hand,
the Southwest (besides California) and the Northwest grant the
most uniformly expansive scope of practice rights.62 The inference,
given the demographics, is that the more rural states of the country
(discounting the Southeast) are the most open to expansive scope
of practice.

56

Jansen, supra note 16, at 57.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org (last
visited Mar. 19, 2015).
58
Jansen, supra note 16, at 59.
59
NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.
60
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/
5397.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (map showing the current landscape of
implementation).
61
BARTON ASSOCIATES, http://www.bartonassociates.com/nurse-practitioners/nurse
-practitioner-scope-of-practice-laws/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (interactive graphic
representing each state’s scope of practice laws).
62
Id.
57
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It would be absurd to account for this discrepancy by saying
that APRNs are simply more qualified to deliver medical care in
rural areas than in urban ones; therefore, more populous states
ostensibly have some reason other than skepticism of the medical
skill of APRNs in their limiting APRN scope of practice. One reason
could be that medical societies do not want APRNs to compete with
physicians, which will be discussed in Part IV, infra. In the
meantime, the reason to hope for Congressional action is that the
matter is bipartisan, and could be addressed without major partisan
rancor, given enough public interest. Of course, the great disparity
between the amounts of lobbying money contributed by the
American Nurses Association ($1,467,064 in 2014) versus the
amount contributed by the AMA ($19,650,000 in 2014) may help
to explain the reluctance of Congress to address the issue.63
B. Recommendations for the States
The IOM report recommends that state legislatures (1) reform
scope of practice regulations to conform to the NCBSN Model Act
and Rules; and (2) “Require third-party payers that participate in
fee-for-service payment arrangements to provide direct
reimbursement to [APRNs] who are practicing within their scope of
practice under state law.”64 This means that private insurance
companies would have to reimburse APRNs directly for specific
services if those services fall within a state’s scope of practice for
APRNs, rather than require a collaborative agreement with a
physician.
i. Reforming Scope of Practice Laws
1. Collaborative Agreements
A collaborative agreement is a tether that binds APRNs to a
supervising physician.65 A typical collaborative agreement, such as
the kind mandated in New Jersey, requires the APRN and the
physician to establish joint protocols for the treatment of patients,
and the immediate presence or electronic availability of the

63

OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=2014
&id=D000000173 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015); Id. at http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000068 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
64
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8.
65
CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS, ADVANCED
PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES 1, 2, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3AFAQScope.pdf.
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collaborating physician.66
The more onerous statutes—like
Missouri’s—contain stringent geographic proximity requirements
and bi-monthly review of patient charts by supervising physicians.67
The main issue with such agreements is that they potentially
constrain the area in which an APRN can provide care, thus limiting
consumers’ access, and restricting the APRN unnecessarily from full
use of his or her training.68
2. Regulatory Structure
State statutes, along with regulations promulgated by state
nursing boards, regulate nursing practice and scope.69 In addition,
states have medical practice acts that may affect nursing scope of
practice by limiting the practice of medicine to medical doctors
exclusively.70 These can lead to murky territory, in which the exact
scope of practice for APRNs is not fully delineated.71 It is therefore
the province of state legislatures to enact reforms to scope of practice
laws. Consequently, it is in state legislatures where most of the
battles over expanded scope are fought. The ultimate goal of APRN
advocates for this legislation is to achieve full scope of practice for
APRNs independent of collaborative agreements.72
3. The Consensus Model for State Regulation
The NCBSN tracks how compliant the states are with the
Consensus Model.73 There are eleven states and one territory with a
perfect NCSBN score for compliance.74 Iowa practically achieved a
perfect score, since the only requirement not met is the actual
“APRN” title (Iowa’s designation is “Advanced Registered Nurse
Practitioner” or “ARNP”).75 However, the moniker “APRN” has
some legal significance for those practitioners who work across state
66
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:11-49 (West 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:35-6.6 (West 2015)
(regulates the standards for joint protocols).
67
MO. REV. STAT. § 334.104 (LexisNexis 2015).
68
CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 65, at 2.
69
Karla Kelly, Nurse Practitioner Challenges to the Orthodox Structure of Health Care
Delivery: Regulation and Restraints on Trade, 11 AM. J. L. & MED. 195, 199 (1985).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 201-203.
72
See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/
738.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
73
See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 60.
74
Id.
75
Iowa Board of Nursing, The Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, IOWA.GOV,
https://nursing.iowa.gov/practice/advanced-registered-nurse-practitioner-role-scope
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
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lines.76 A perfect score means that the state or territory has adopted
all four APRN titles and roles (CNP, CRNA, CNM, CNS), licensing,
education, and certification requirements, and most relevant to the
immediate discussion, allows independent practice and
independent prescribing without written collaboration agreements.77
A poor score means that the state has not adopted the nomenclature
and does not allow independent practice. Among the lowest scoring
states are New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, and Alabama.78 In between
are states that, inter alia, allow independent practice but not
independent prescriptive rights (Wisconsin), or fully meet all
licensing and title specifications but allow no independence
(Texas), or give expanded rights to some APRNs, but not others
(North Carolina).79
a. New Jersey Scope of Practice Reform
New Jersey’s main sponsor of a bill eliminating collaborative
agreements cites a rural New Jersey APRN who was the primary
provider for “thousands of patients” as an example of the need for
the legislation. This APRN had to stop providing care when her
Introduced in 2012 by
supervising physician retired.80
Assemblywoman Munoz, the New Jersey Consumer Access to
Healthcare Act (“Bill”) would bring sweeping change to New Jersey’s
scope of practice for APRNs.81 Specifically, it would eliminate the
need for any collaborative agreement between any APRN (all roles)
and a physician, and it would also allow full prescriptive privileges
for qualifying APRNs.82 This would bring New Jersey up to almost
complete compliance with the Model Rules; the only noncompliant portion is that the proposed act continues to refer to the

76

Tracy Klein, State Implementation of the APRN Consensus Model, HEALTH POLICY
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 327 (Kelly A. Goudreau &
Mary Smolenski eds., 2013) (“Lack of uniform titling provided several disadvantages
to APRNs who are required to use state-protected titles in business communications,
particularly when practice is located across state lines.”).
77
See Major Components of the Consensus Model by State, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE
BOARDS OF NURSING (2014), https://www.ncsbn.org/2014.07_18_Julymapwith
points.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (contains a chart that shows the points system
and each state’s score).
78
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 60.
79
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 75.
80
Lisette Hilton, New York/New Jersey legislation could test APN ‘tether’, NURSE.COM
(June 3, 2013), http://news.nurse.com/article/20130603/NY01/106030005#.VGFKb
_TF-EM.
81
Assemb. B. 906, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
82
Id.

AND
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subject as Advanced Practice Nurses (“APN”), rather than APRN.83
The Executive Committee of the New Jersey Board of Medical
Examiners opposed the Senate version of the Bill, expressing its
opposition based upon three main concerns: that under certain
circumstances a physician should be brought in to give treatment,
and the Bill erodes those circumstances; that the Bill could result in
raised medical malpractice insurance premiums for physicians; and
that consumers should be advised as to who (i.e., the actual role of
the practitioner and her education and title) is actually providing
healthcare.84 As to the first complaint, there is no explanation as to
why a physician could not be brought in if needed, even under the
new language of the Act.85 The Act does not command APRNs to
never contact a physician; it simply seeks to expand the scope of
practice to the extent of training. It should also be noted that even
physicians have a duty to refer patients whose care exceeds their
competence, and face malpractice suits if they fail in that duty;
therefore, there is no reason that APRNs should not face the same
liability.86
Regarding the second objection, there does not appear to be
evidence that relaxed licensing laws cause malpractice premiums to
increase. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research,
for example, while restrictive scope of practice laws tend to lead to
greater healthcare costs, more liberal laws lead to no change in
malpractice premiums.87 Other sources show similar results.88
However, this is an evolving area of the law, and its breadth cannot
be covered in this Note.
83

Id.
New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, Open Board Agenda (Jan. 13, 2013),
http://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/bme/Agendas/bmeage_010913.pdf.
85
See David Gorski, Expanding the scope of practice of advanced practice nurses will not
endanger patients, SCIENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sciencebased
medicine.org/expanding-the-scope-of-practice-of-advanced-practice-nurses-does-notendanger-patients/ (“What happens when a physician encounters something in the
course of diagnosis or treatment that goes very wrong and he doesn’t have the training
to handle it? He calls in other physicians who can handle it!”).
86
See Tine Hansen-Turton et al., Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 1235, 1251-52 (2010). This area of the law is changing rapidly. This Note will
not further address the issue, as it deserves much greater attention than can be given
here.
87
See Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements:
Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 1, 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19906, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19906.pdf.
88
APRN Scope of Practice: Access to Care and Medical Malpractice, MICHIGAN COUNCIL
OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, http://www.micnp.org/files/Comparison%20of%20other%
20states%20sheet.pdf.
84

BARBARITO FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE NURSE WILL SEE YOU NOW

2/5/2016 8:56 PM

143

As to the objection that the public would not be adequately
advised as to who provides their healthcare, that objection
essentially tracks the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign.89 That
campaign ostensibly seeks to keep healthcare consumers informed
about who is providing their healthcare, but could effectively work
to punish nurses who may legitimately lay claim to the title
“Doctor,” such as APRNs who also have achieved a doctorate
degree.90 While patients have a legitimate concern in knowing their
provider’s qualifications, the proposed legislation in that campaign
is largely duplicative of current state legislation.91 It would treat
clinicians unequally, applying standards to nurses that are not
applied to physicians.92
b. Other States’ Efforts
The continuing objections in other states echo the same themes
as those in New Jersey. The Michigan State Medical Society calls its
state’s scope of nursing practice proposal “unproven and
controversial.”93 While it is controversial, because medical societies
keep objecting to it, it is obviously not unproven, given the breadth
of similar laws already enacted.94 Florida’s bill proposal would
allow APRNs (in Florida, ARNPs) to practice independently, and to
prescribe controlled substances and narcotics, leading the Florida
Medical Association to insinuate that Florida would “move
backwards” in its fight to curb prescription medicine abuse.95 The
Association cited no study supporting its insinuation, nor is the
contention supported elsewhere.96 That bill subsequently died in
committee.97 The Massachusetts Medical Society also toes the line

89
See generally AMA ADVOCACY RES. CTR., “TRUTH IN ADVERTISING” CAMPAIGN 1, 2
(AM. MED. 2012).
90
Learn the Truth about AMA’s Truth in Advertising Campaign, NATIONAL ASS’N OF
CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, http://www.nacns.org/docs/TruthTransparencyTalking
Points.pdf.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Put Patients First! Urge Your State Rep to Vote NO on Senate Bill 2, MICHIGAN STATE
MED. SOC’Y. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.msms.org/AboutMSMS/News/tabid/178/ID/
1375/Put-Patients-First-Urge-Your-State-Rep-to-Vote-NO-on-Senate-Bill-2.aspx.
94
See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra note 77.
95
Scope of Practice Expansion, A Prescription for Trouble, FLORIDA MED. ASS’N.,
http://www.flmedical.org/Stop_7113.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
96
Id.
97
H.B. 7071, House of Representatives, (Fl. 2014), available at http://www.
myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=52482 (last visited Mar. 20,
2015).
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set by the AMA, “arguing [expanded scope of practice] was contrary
to an optimal physician-led, team-based healthcare delivery model
and was a possible threat to patient safety.”98 Once again, it referred
to no study revealing a possible threat.99
As demonstrated above, while legislation on the issue is active
in many states, states’ medical societies oppose expanded scope of
practice.100 Most of those medical societies have significant
lobbying influence.101 Consequently, much of the scope of practice
legislation on the slate for 2014 died, whether in committee, by
vote, or by veto.102 Expanded scope of practice is getting a hearing
in the states, but the opposition, coming almost solely from
physicians’ groups, is as fierce as it is unfounded.
4. An Emerging Strategy
Perhaps the best plan for APRN advocates is a piecemeal
strategy. The legislation that has been struck down largely proposes
sweeping changes that immediately conform to the Model Act.103
However, the comments made by Nebraska Governor Dave
Heineman when he vetoed that state’s APRN reform bill suggest that
a different approach might work. In addition to his statement about
conferring with his chief medical officer, Governor Heineman spoke
of his willingness to enact smaller changes.104 Tying independence
to some sort of clinical experience regime that will eventually be
understood as a residency or its equivalent may lead to successful
legislation. In New Jersey, while the aforementioned Consumer
Access to Healthcare bill has not moved forward, Assemblywoman
98

Statehouse Update: Practice Expansion for APNs Rejected, MASSACHUSETTS MED. SOC.,
(Aug. 2014) http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/Vital-Signs/StatehouseUpdate--Practice-Expansion-for-APNs-Rejected/#.Vpq4lPkrK70 (last visited Mar. 20,
2015).
99
Id.
100
See, e.g., FLORIDA MED. ASS’N., supra note 95; MICHIGAN STATE MED. SOC’Y., supra
note 93; New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, supra note 84, at 2-3.
101
Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’
Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 304 (2002)
(“Whenever scope-of-practice issues arise, legislators are bombarded by heavilyfinanced lobbying efforts emanating from state and national professional associations,
individual health care providers (who are also voters), and interested citizens.”).
102
AANP gives thumbs down to Nebraska veto of NP practice bill, NURSE.COM (Apr. 24,
2014)
http://news.nurse.com/article/20140424/NATIONAL06/140424001#.
VGKktvTF-EM (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (stating that after conference with his chief
medical advisor, Nebraska’s Governor vetoed the expanded practice bill passed
unanimously by his legislature).
103
See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.
104
NURSE.COM, supra note 102.
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Munoz successfully passed a bill allowing APRNs to determine a
patient’s cause of death.105 Furthermore, as previously stated,
successful scope of practice expansion has been achieved when the
legislation requires nurses to have a certain threshold of clinical
experience within a collaborative agreement scheme before they
may be un-tethered and strike out on their own.106 These examples
show that when it comes to passing laws in this context, some states
prefer incremental, rather than comprehensive, change, and adding
mandated hours of clinical experience may be the middle ground
that ushers in more successful legislation.107
ii. Reimbursement from Third Party Payers
Finally, the IOM report recommends that states require third
party payers to reimburse APRNs directly.108 This provision was
added because “few if any third-party payors recognize nursing
services that are not bundled with medical management and,
therefore, nursing services are not directly reimbursed.”109 In short,
nurses cannot get paid unless a physician who does the billing on
their behalf is supervising them. Consequently, APRNs received
reimbursement “indirectly, incident to physicians, and at a
considerably lower rate.”110 Such reimbursement schemes create a
de facto tether to physicians. Independence issues aside, the
outcomes for patients tend to improve with intervention from
nurses, and without an accounting mechanism for nurse
intervention that direct reimbursement could supply, valuable care
may be lost.111
Private third party insurers are regulated by the individual
states.112 Federal mandates that typically govern third party
105
Press Release, New Jersey Assembly Republicans, Gov. Signs Muñoz Bill
Allowing APNs to Determine Cause of Death (May 4, 2015) (on file with author).
106
See, e.g., Adam Rubenfire, Some N.Y. Nurse Practitioners to be Freed of Doc
Supervision in 2015, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 30, 2014) http://www.modern
healthcare.com/article/20141230/NEWS/312309974/some-n-y-nurse-practitionersto-be-freed-of-doc-supervision-in-2015 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing New
York law conditioning independent practice upon 3,600 hours of clinical experience).
107
Jansen, supra note 16, at 394.
108
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8.
109
Martha J. Price & Patricia H. Parkerton, Care Delivery Challenges for
Nursing, 107 AM. J. OF NURSING (2007), available at http://journals.lww.com/ajnonline/
Fulltext/2007/06001/Care_Delivery_Challenges_for_Nursing.22.aspx.
110
ANN B. HAMRIC ET AL., ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 569
(Elsevier Health Sciences ed., 5th ed. 2013).
111
Price & Parkerton, supra note 109.
112
HAMRIC ET AL., supra note 110, at 569.
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reimbursement in the realm of Medicare and Medicaid are often
blocked by discriminatory rules and regulations regarding “nonphysician” and “mid-level” providers.113 Thus, there is an arbitrary
reimbursement system in place that discriminates against APRNs,
without regard for patient outcomes. This proposition invokes the
philosophical question of whether providers are paid for the quality
of their outcomes, or the quality, quantity, and cost of their
educations, to wit: should a physician receive more reimbursement
for her treatment of strep throat than a nurse practitioner for the
exact same treatment, because the physician presumably has the
greater education? Under a fee-for-service regime, does perceived
expertise have a bearing on outcomes? Regardless of these more
esoteric considerations, the point of the IOM recommendation is,
presumably, to pay people directly for the healthcare they actually
can provide, rather than filter that payment through unnecessary
middlemen.
IV. PHYSICIAN OPPOSITION AND ANTITRUST
A. Physician Opposition and the Objective Evidence
The main opposition to expanded scope of practice comes from
contentions by physicians that APRNs do not receive adequate
training to be entrusted with the ability to exercise the full extent of
that training. The AMA listed the disparity in clinical experience
between doctors and nurses as its main opposition to the IOM
report.114 In 2014, New York passed legislation expanding practice
for registered nurse practitioners.115 One vocal opponent of that
legislation cited the AMA verbatim in his scathing criticism of the
new law.116 He further cited to a 1999 study suggesting that NPs
may resort to more diagnostic tests, thus negating any economic
benefits.117 However, no opposing party has actually cited to any
research supporting the contention that APRNs provide inferior
care; in fact, studies tend to show the opposite. Specifically, a
systematic review compiling nearly two decades of research found
that “care delivered by APRNs and care delivered by physicians

113

Id.
Press Release, supra note 3.
115
Rubenfire, supra note 106.
116
Sandeep Jauhar, Nurses Are Not Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/nurses-are-not-doctors.html?_r=2
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
117
Id.
114
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(alone or in teams without an APRN) produce equivalent patient
outcomes.”118 Of course, this study focuses on the kinds of patients
whom APRNs and physicians are qualified to treat in common;
there are many high risk or severely compromised patients whom
APRNs do not treat.
The 2011 study, a meta-analysis examining 29 separate patient
outcomes (as opposed to patient preferences) from a total of 69
studies conducted over 18 years, demonstrated that in no category
did patients experience more adverse outcomes under the care of
APRNs than under that of physicians.119 In fact, APRNs’ patients
presented more favorable outcomes in certain categories.120 In a
2012 report critical of expanded scope of practice legislation, the
Physicians Foundation—whose mission is to oppose expansion of
non-physicians’ scope of practice—acknowledged that “[t]he
research literature shows, without exception, that within their areas
of training and experience, nurse practitioners provide care that is as
good as or better than that provided by physicians.”121 The report
goes on to question the validity of one of those studies, which it
claims—without substantiation—is the definitive study on the
topic, and fails to mention the above 2011 meta-analysis.122 The
report suggests bias, observing (without providing evidence
supporting the implication) that APRN advocates performed much
of the research in the area.123
This conflict of interest criticism intimated by the Physicians
Foundation is ultimately disingenuous. A 1986 policy analysis
submitted to Congress by the now-defunct Office of Technology
Assessment (“OTA”) found that “[t]he weight of the evidence
118
Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30; see also Jeffrey C. Bauer, Nurse
Practitioners as an Underutilized Resource for Health Reform: Evidence-Based Demonstrations
of Cost-effectiveness, 22 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS 228, 228-231 (2010).
119
Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Playing
Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939,
985 (1999) (“Outcomes studies are [a] kind of research intended to establish better
correlations between what physicians do during clinical care and the results that
patients actually experience, both long-and short-term”).
120
Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30.
121
STEPHEN ISAACS & PAUL JELLINEK, ACCEPT NO SUBSTITUTE: A REPORT ON SCOPE OF
PRACTICE
1,
42
(The
Physicians
Found.,
Nov.
2012),
http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/A_Report_on_Scope_of_Practi
ce.pdf.
122
Id. at 29.
123
Id.; While such a conflict of interest may present a negative connotation, the
report fails to point to any research whatsoever in the area performed by anyone else
who may be more neutral, and in fact lists as a goal for physicians, funding of such
research.
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indicates that, within their areas of competence, NPs . . . and CNMs
provide care [the quality of which] is equivalent to that of care
provided by physicians.”124 The OTA was committed to providing
objective and non-partisan information to Congress; it was not
prone to a pro-APRN bias.125 Though that report is nearly thirty
years old, no apparent subsequent research refutes it, and it has been
substantially upheld by later studies.126 While at the end of the day
the report does not include the most recent areas of practice, taken
with the 2011 study, and the acknowledgement of the Physicians
Foundation that all empirical evidence points inexorably to the fact
of equivalent patient outcomes, and lacking any evidence to the
contrary, physicians appear to base their opposition not upon an
objective scientific standard, but upon their own unsubstantiated
prejudices. Of course, it is quite possible that physicians view
expanded scope of practice as a competitive threat to their business;
if that is the case, then the issue demands antitrust analysis.
B. Antitrust
Antitrust law is about the competitive effects of certain types of
conduct that potentially adversely affects the price, quality, and
availability of a product—in this case healthcare—thereby
impinging on the welfare of consumers.127 Physicians and APRNs
are competitors, not because they offer the exact same services to the
same populations, but because their services are potential
substitutes.128 This is not to say that APRNs should replace
physicians, nor that the competitors should not also collaborate, or
even work for each other.129 Rather, all other factors being equal,
this antitrust analysis seeks to expose harm to the consumer
resulting from anticompetitive behavior which, but for underrationalized or arbitrary regulations put in place by one interested
competitor and sanctioned by governments, would not occur.
The IOM report speaks directly to matters of antitrust, where it
124
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NURSE PRACTITIONERS, PHYSICIAN
ASSISTANTS, AND CERTIFIED NURSE-MIDWIVES: A POLICY ANALYSIS, 37 Health Tech. Case
Study 1, 5 (1986), http://ota.fas.org/reports/8615.pdf.
125
The OTA Legacy, PRINCETON UNIV., https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2015).
126
See, e.g., Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30.
127
See generally Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing:
Federal Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 154-55
(2014).
128
Id. at 156.
129
Id. at 157.
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urges the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice to review current legislation
and laws in the states for possible anticompetitive effects.130
Furthermore, antitrust issues arise when one particular coalition of
professionals gathers to undermine a perceived rival coalition’s
ability to compete.131 In this case, the American Medical Association
and the assorted State medical societies/associations make up
coalitions, though their efforts may not reach the level of antitrust;
or if they do, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine may protect those
actions. Regarding legislation, the FTC has had a hand in guiding
state legislatures away from passing anticompetitive laws.132 The
advocacy function of the FTC may prove exceedingly influential,
and the agency has certainly taken up the IOM’s call.133 The
remainder of this Note will focus briefly on the FTC’s role in
antitrust action, and then move into discussions of the Sherman Act
generally, as well as the Noerr-Pennington and State Action
doctrines, which are the primary limitations to antitrust action.
Finally, this Note will address N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.
FTC,134 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, which bears
on the issue.
i. The FTC
Regulatory restrictions on APRN scope of practice have drawn
attention from the FTC’s competition advocacy program.135 The
FTC’s interest in the issue is drawn from the FTC Act itself, which
“prohibits ‘[u]nfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or
deceptive acts or practices,’ and gives the FTC a mandate ‘to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations’ from engaging in such
prohibited methods, acts, and practices.”136 In the healthcare arena,
the FTC has “investigated restrictions on the business practices of
healthcare providers, scrutinized proposed mergers, and brought
enforcement actions against healthcare providers that have violated
federal competition law.”137 Subsequent congressional legislation
has enhanced the Commission, such that “[e]conomic and policy

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8-S-9.
See Discussion, infra Part IV.B.ii.
Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127, at 153-54.
Id.
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (U.S. 2015).
Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127, at 144.
Id. at 149.
Id.
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research and competition advocacy . . . are at the core of the FTC’s
statutory mission, alongside the Commission’s civil law
enforcement responsibilities.”138
The result is an FTC that may influence and enforce policy.
Substantial challenges exist to enforcing competition through
litigation, such that the FTC cannot always act as a litigious sword
in the hands of regulators, but must instead sometimes work more
passively, through legislatures and legislators, to promote
competition policy at a formative level.139 The FTC’s role in this
context has been discussed comprehensively elsewhere, and will not
be further discussed at length here.140
ii. The Sherman Act, Section 1, Generally
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal, and criminalizes
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade.141 A section 1 claimant
must initially prove three elements: (1) an agreement or conspiracy
between at least two persons or distinct business entities; (2) to
harm or restrain competition; (3) which actually injures
competition.142 Opposition to expanding the scope of APRN
practice seems like a deceptively simple, per se instance of restraint
of trade by the AMA and other medical societies, or state boards of
medicine: (1) physicians make up such societies or boards, and are
persons or distinct business entities within the meaning of the
statute, and have obviously agreed to work together in this regard,143
(2) their agreement is to advocate for policies, which work to the
detriment of APRN competition with them, and (3) this harms
consumers, since without the ability to practice to the full extent of
their scope, APRNs cannot offer their services, even when those
services match those of competing physicians. Antitrust may be
unavailing in this context, though, because of two doctrines: the
138
Id. at 150, see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 17th Annual Antitrust Symposium: 100
is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100 Years, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1131, 1132 (“The FTC should always consider the many non-enforcement tools it can
use to help stop consumer harm before it arises, thus sparing consumers and businesses
unnecessary losses and saving the taxpayer money that we would otherwise spend on
litigation.”).
139
See generally Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127.
140
Id.
141
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
142
Oltz v. Saint Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988).
143
See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 200 (2010)
(“Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted action . . . when the parties
to the agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself” such that “the
intrafirm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action”).
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State Action Doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
iii. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Briefly, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects the First
Amendment right of citizens, including trade groups, to earnestly
petition the government to adopt a particular course of action, “no
matter how anticompetitive the action sought.”144 Its reach is
sweeping, covering all three branches of government, as well as
administrative agencies.145 In Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight,146 the case from which the doctrine takes its name,
“railroads were genuinely lobbying the legislature for laws that
would favor them at the expense of their competitors,” which, given
the First Amendment right to petition and our common
understanding of representative government, is a fairly intuitive
right to afford protection.147 United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington148 was a similarly intuitive case, extending Noerr
immunity to petitions of the Executive.149 Finally, California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited150 extended Noerr-Pennington
immunity to entities interacting with the courts and administrative
agencies, but applied the “sham” exception for the first time.151 The
“sham” exception stands for the principle that “when efforts to
influence government action are considered ‘sham,’ the petition is
stripped of its immunity.”152 In other words, immunity is lost when
advocacy efforts are an obvious charade, not pursued in good faith,
but rather pursued as a means to obfuscate otherwise prohibited
intentions.
Observed in light of the sham exception, physicians’
organizations’ efforts to petition the legislature against APRN scope
of practice are suspect. Assuming that physicians’ societies and
boards deserve the benefit of the doubt regarding their good faith
belief that APRNs are insufficiently trained or competent to practice
independently, one might think that they are being deliberately
144
Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (2003).
145
Id.
146
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
147
Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 974.
148
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
149
Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 974-75.
150
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
151
Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 975.
152
Lao, supra note 144, at 967; see, e.g., California Motor Transport Co., 404 U.S. at
511-12.
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obtuse regarding the objective research on APRN outcomes.
However, the Supreme Court has eviscerated the sham exception to
the point that it is essentially worthless in this context, even when
Noerr-Pennington immunity stands to severely injure consumers.153
In a legislative context, sham as an exception to NoerrPennington is useless, even if it involves fraud or
misrepresentation.154 Even if, hypothetically, interest groups
petitioning legislatures do so in bad faith, and use entirely false data
to support their positions, Noerr-Pennington is an absolute shield
against antitrust liability. There is simply no chance to pursue
antitrust litigation in this context, nor is this Note meant to propose
changes to the doctrine.
Nonetheless, the sham exception remains robust in the context
of litigation or administrative processes.155 Unfortunately, how this
may apply to the immediate matter is unclear. The AMA and other
such organizations are not bringing lawsuits against APRNs to
enjoin their practice; if they were, then the sham exception might
apply. Instead, there are currently physicians serving on state
medical boards, whose recommendations defining the practice of
medicine become the law. As state appointees, those regulators are
shielded by the State Action Doctrine, and are thus immune from
antitrust action. However, a new exception, recently delineated and
discussed infra, may change this situation.
iv. The State Action Doctrine
The State Action Doctrine, in the antitrust context, reinforces
the principles of federalism immunizing state action from antitrust
challenge. Thus, a state agency may theoretically engage in
anticompetitive behavior without the risk of antitrust action,
though it should be noted that “a state cannot ‘give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.’”156
The state agencies of concern to this Note are boards of
medicine, which define the scope of the practice of medicine for a

153

Lao, supra note 144, at 979.
See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 382 (1991).
155
Lao, supra note 144, at 988-89; see, e.g., Kottle v. N.W. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d
1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998); Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d
394, 402 (4th Cir. 2001).
156
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)), aff’d, N.C. State Bd. of Dental
Examiners v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35, 48 (U.S. 2015).
154
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state.157
Board membership typically consists of volunteers
ordinarily appointed by the governor, most of whom are usually
physicians, though several non-physicians often serve as well.158 In
New Jersey, for example, the enabling statute gives the governor
appointment rights for the Board of Medical Examiners (as it is
called in New Jersey), and outlines all of the responsibilities of the
Board; in particular, the Board decides the scope of practice of
medicine, and enforces that scope through the Attorney General.159
The statute specifically states that the “Governor shall give due
consideration to, but shall not be bound by, recommendations
submitted by the appropriate professional organizations of this
State.”160 In other words, professional, private organizations have a
voice in gubernatorial appointments to the boards. While it makes
sense that the governor receives advice regarding who the best
candidate would be for the position, it is nonetheless suspicious
when the law requires the exectuive branch to listen to a
professional organization’s recommendations as to board members
who will decide who gets to compete with it. Although a prudent
assessment of that professional organization’s conduct may find
conflicts of interest, the State Action Doctrine renders it immune to
judicial scrutiny. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in N.C. State
Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC recently made it somewhat harder for
state boards to engage in anticompetitive behavior.161
v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC
The pertinent facts of the case arose when the North Carolina
Board of Dental Examiners decided to investigate, and then
independently issue cease and desist orders to non-dentists
engaging in the commercial business of teeth-whitening, which the
Board considered to be the practice of dentistry.162 As Justice
Kennedy later observed, while North Carolina had delegated control
to the Board over the practice of dentistry, the relatively new practice
157
Oregon. v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (D. Or. 2002) (“The
determination of what constitutes a legitimate medical practice or purpose
traditionally has been left to the individual states”).
158
FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., Frequently Asked Questions About State Medical Boards,
http://www.fsmb.org/policy/public-resources/frequent-questions#g1 (last visited Mar.
20, 2015).
159
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-2.1 (West 2015).
160
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-2.2 (West 2015).
161
See generally Dental Exam’rs, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 35.
162
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013),
aff’d, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (U.S. 2015).
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of teeth whitening was not included in the empowering act as “the
practice of dentistry.”163 The FTC charged the Board with
“violating 15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC Act, by excluding non-dentist
teeth whiteners from the market” in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.164 The Board petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review,
seeking application of the State Action Doctrine.165
1. The Fourth Circuit Decision
First, the Fourth Circuit upheld the earlier determination by the
FTC that as a “public/private hybrid entit[y]” the Board lacked
government supervision, and was therefore a private actor.166 In
concluding that the Board was not exempt under state action, the
Fourth Circuit looked specifically at the “Parker Doctrine,” which
lists three situations under which an entity can claim immunity.167
The Board had claimed immunity under the second Parker
situation—the Midcal test—wherein “private parties can claim
the Parker exemption if acting pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed [] state policy’ and their behavior is ‘actively
supervised by the State itself.’”168
Recognizing that
“fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic
competition [] are embodied in the federal antitrust laws,” the court
sanctioned state-action immunity “only when [] clear that the
challenged anticompetitive conduct [was] undertaken pursuant to a
regulatory scheme that [was] the State’s own.”169
The court went on to determine that the regulatory scheme in
question failed the Midcal test, since the Board could not show that
it was actively supervised by the State.170 According to the Fourth
Circuit, the Board lacked supervision because its membership was
elected exclusively by private actors—that is, only other dentists
elected the Board, without the involvement of the Governor or any

163

Dental Examiners, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 46.
Dental Examiners, 717 F.3d at 365.
165
Id. at 366.
166
Id. at 368-70.
167
Id. at 366 (citing S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 442 (4th Cir.
2006)); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568, (1984); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, (2013).
168
Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 367 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105) (1980)).
169
Id. at 367-68 (internal quotations omitted).
170
Id. at 368.
164
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other elected official.171 This was sufficient for the FTC—and
subsequently the Fourth Circuit—to hold that the board was a
private entity, even though it was created through an act of the State.
However, while the concurring opinion’s gloss on the majority
opinion stressed that the ruling was narrow, and that had the Board
been chosen by elected officials, Midcal would have been satisfied,
the Supreme Court’s recent decision has broadened the ruling
remarkably.172
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision
In affirming the Fourth Circuit, Justice Kennedy stressed that to
gain Parker immunity, a state agency must prove “more than a mere
façade of state involvement,” specifically, that “[the] States accept
political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and
control.”173 The Court recognized that the private concerns of active
market participants, when those participants serve on state agencies,
pose a danger to consumers if private actors work to further their
own interests, rather than those of the State.174 Therefore, the
government must seek assurance that those private actors are in fact
pursuing the State’s interests in addition to their own.175 The Court
went on to hold that state boards controlled by active participants
in the market which the board regulates must satisfy the active
market participation test of Midcal in order to enjoy Parker
immunity.
The Court introduced a test for “active supervision” that would
satisfy Midcal.176 As a general proposition, such an inquiry is
“flexible and context-dependent.”177 Supervision “need not entail
day-to-day involvement in an agency’s operations,” but must probe
“whether the State’s review mechanisms provide ‘realistic assurance’
that a nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct ‘promotes state
policy, rather than merely the party’s individual interests.’”178 The
171
Id. at 377 (Keenan, C.J., concurring) (“Here, the fact that the Board is comprised
of private dentists elected by other private dentists, along with North Carolina’s lack of
active supervision of the Board’s activities, leaves us with little confidence that the state
itself, rather than a private consortium of dentists, chose to regulate dental health in
this manner at the expense of robust competition for teeth whitening services.”).
172
See id. at 376-77.
173
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35, 48-49 (2015).
174
Id. at 49.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 55.
177
Id.
178
Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01 (1988)).
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Court identified four specific requirements of state supervision: first,
the state supervisor must review the substance of an anticompetitive
board decision, not simply whether it was procedurally proper;
second, the supervisor must have the power to modify or veto the
decision; third, the supervisor must be an active participant in the
decision, rather than simply having the potential to intervene; and
fourth, the supervisor may not itself be an active market
participant.179 The Court then stated that further analysis would rely
upon context and the specific circumstances of the case.180
3. Implications of Dental Examiners
While the Court’s decision in the case has not completely
opened the door for APRNs to expand their scope of practice, it has
limited the ability of state boards to act in an anticompetitive
manner without the mandate of the State. The FTC charged the
Dental Board when the Board unilaterally sought to enforce its own
definition of the practice of dentistry; a definition that was not
statutorily enunciated because, as Justice Kennedy observed, the
statute did not include “teeth whitening” in its definition.181 The
Board’s particular violation of antitrust law was its unsupervised
action taken against competitors. If the Board had written the cease
and desist letters under proper supervision, then the FTC would
have had no case. Accordingly, state boards of medicine may not
take such anticompetitive, unilateral action with regard to those
they judge to exceed the scope of practice. Whether such action is
currently being taken, however, is not immediately apparent.
This decision should force states to reexamine their current
oversight of professional boards. While states probably have
sufficient process to cover the Court’s active supervision test under
their Administrative Procedure Acts, it is obvious, given the facts of
Dental Examiners, that there are some actions of state boards that
may have otherwise been overlooked.182 In New Jersey, for example,
state licensing boards are vested with investigative powers.183 While
state licensing boards must exercise these investigative powers
through the attorney general, that process must be examined in light

179

N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 55.
Id.
181
Id. at 46.
182
See generally, John Gedid, Administrative Procedure for the Twenty-First Century: An
Introduction to the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 44 ST. MARY’S L. J. 241
(2012).
183
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-18 (West 2015).
180
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of the Dental Examiners test to ensure proper oversight.184 The New
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners certainly falls under the auspices
of Dental Examiners, since the Board is comprised of at least 16 MDs
and/or DOs (Doctors of Osteopathy), all of whom should be
considered active market participants.185 Furthermore, the Board is
given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it.186 It is
not absurd to think that the Board could use this power in an
intimidating, anticompetitive manner, just as the North Carolina
Dental Board used cease and desist letters.
Ultimately, Dental Examiners calls for sufficient oversight of
specific actions taken by state boards. I do not contend that it
reaches those medical societies and advocates covered by the NoerrPennington Doctrine, nor do I propose that it can erode legislation
or regulations duly enacted by elected state actors. The decision
affects the anticompetitive actions of Boards when they have not
been specifically empowered to operate in this manner. If the New
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners decided tomorrow to start
sending letters to nurse practitioners demanding that they cease and
desist treating patients, even when they are doing so under a stateapproved collaboration scheme with a physician, then that would
definitely fall under the kind of behavior prohibited by Dental
Examiners.
I doubt one could successfully argue that Dental Examiners
affects scope of practice statutes, since those are passed by the
legislature. Legislation of this kind is necessarily exempt from
federal antitrust action due to the state action doctrine. State boards
of medicine do not themselves create and pass scope of practice
laws, and to the extent that they regulate the practice of medicine,
those regulations must pass scrutiny by the legislature, thus
satisfying the active supervision requirement.187 Only if it could be
shown that a state board had such autonomy as to pass scope of
practice regulations without meaningful review from the legislature
could Dental Examiners overturn such legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
The facts favoring the expansion of the scope of practice for
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses are compelling, and
momentum is entirely in favor of expansion. It is up to the
184
185
186
187

See id.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-1 (West 2015).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-2 (West 2015).
See generally Gedid, supra note 182, at 33.
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legislatures to act, however, and though change may occur
incrementally, it continues towards expansion. Although Dental
Examiners may prove a strong tool for antitrust litigants against
specific anticompetitive actions taken by state boards of medicine,
it is limited to those circumstances when boards actually take such
action themselves, and should not affect scope of practice
legislation.
Since Noerr-Pennington allows any sort of
misrepresentation to be made in support of the prospect that only
physicians will be the gatekeepers to public health, the legislatures
should allow themselves to be guided, not by the campaign
contributions of physicians’ organizations, but by the social
contributions of nurses and their advocates.
The ultimate point of Dental Examiners, and the point of scope
of practice legislation, is that legislatures, not private actors, should
decide what is best for the public welfare. This is not to say that
legislators are themselves all experts in the fields of medicine or
nursing. Legislators are experts in the field of governing, and are
entrusted with the just governance of the people, and with their
welfare. They are also accountable to those people, which is why
they are so entrusted. The Noerr-Pennington and State Action
doctrines represent the recognition that legislators must be free to
govern as they see fit. I do not argue against that proposition, or
those doctrines. It is apparent that the decision regarding the proper
scope of practice for APRNs lies in the hands of legislators, not
physicians or nurses. I only argue that such a decision must be
properly informed by objective study and careful consideration, by
the opinions of both physicians and nurses, and by the concern for
the overall health and welfare of state populations, not by concern
for physicians’ pocketbooks.

